Ridership came in below half of forecast, and a draft county deal would charge at least $250 million to exit
By Jose E. Navarro, MBA | The Navarro Report
MIAMI. The trains between Miami and Orlando are still running, but the companies that sit above the railroad are in bankruptcy court. Seventeen Brightline Florida parent companies filed for Chapter 11 on September 24, Mass Transit reported. The operating railroad did not file, and the company says service is unaffected. Meanwhile, Miami-Dade County is still weighing a commuter-rail contract with the same company.
The operating numbers explain the filing. WKMG in Orlando reported that Brightline carried a record 3.1 million passengers in 2025, against a projection of about 6.6 million. Ticket revenue was $173.2 million, against a projection of $485 million. The operating loss was $127 million, cash fell 52 percent to $139 million, and auditor Ernst & Young issued a going-concern warning. Reports of total debt differ, from $5.5 billion to $7.1 billion in the Mass Transit account.
Public money is already in the structure. Smart Cities Dive reports $985 million in commuter bonds issued through the Florida Development Finance Corporation, within roughly $4.4 billion in municipal debt. The South Florida commuter rights sit with an affiliate outside the bankruptcy, but they are pledged as collateral for bonds that have gone months without interest payments, according to Mass Transit. Separately, Brightline East defaulted on $1.12 billion in 11 percent senior secured notes after expanding bridge financing in June without noteholder consent, and those holders are outside the restructuring deal.
Now consider what Miami-Dade may sign. WLRN reported on a 149-page draft agreement dated May 31 for a service with five stops between downtown Miami and Aventura. It puts annual operating and maintenance costs near $33.9 million. A 2024 Brightline investor memo cited by WLRN described $330 million in county milestone payments. If the county terminates for convenience, it must pay no less than $250 million.
The county has already committed money. WLRN lists $72 million approved in 2019 for an Aventura station and nearly $200 million approved in 2023 for commuter rail, matched by a state grant. In 2024 the Federal Transit Administration pledged up to $389.5 million. A new contract would add to that public stake, not start it.
Control provisions matter as much as dollars. Under the draft, Brightline buys the new train cars at county expense and chooses the construction contractors. The county may request new stations only once every five years, and Brightline has sole discretion to approve them. Brightline may suspend service if it decides county-approved funding is insufficient. A county spokesperson told WLRN the agreement remains under development and subject to review, with no vote scheduled. I could not find a public record that the commission has voted.
A controller reads a contract by asking what happens if the other side fails. S&P Global, per WLRN, stopped rating Brightline after cutting it into junk territory, and the track owner, Florida East Coast Railway, is in litigation and arbitration with Brightline over the commuter plan. The draft says changes requested by the track owner may require federal approval. Those facts do not prove the project will fail. They do show a counterparty carrying more risk than the draft assigns to it.
Brightline deserves a fair hearing. Its stakeholders committed $490 million in new long-term capital, and the company says the restructuring will “significantly deleverage” its balance sheet. Ridership is rising, up 16 percent from January through May. Commuter rail also has real appeal for the neighborhoods it would connect, from Wynwood to North Miami Beach. Brightline says its plans, including the Orlando-to-Tampa extension and a new Cocoa station, are unchanged. The Tampa development rights also sit outside the filing.
Orlando has its own stake. Mass Transit reports a $57.5 million federal award for the Cocoa station and a $78.9 million grant to replace the St. Lucie River rail bridge in Stuart, a project estimated at $262 million. Both sit on the corridor between the two cities. Central Florida riders want reliable service, and taxpayers who fund grants want to know whether those dollars are secured against a restructuring.
Three steps would protect the public without taking a side on rail. First, the commission should wait for an independent review of Brightline’s post-bankruptcy balance sheet before voting. Second, the county should seek balanced terms: milestone payments held in escrow or tied to completed work, a termination fee that scales with the county’s progress, and limits on Brightline’s right to suspend service. Third, the county should publish its total exposure in one table, covering operating costs, milestone payments, prior commitments and termination liability, with ridership forecasts tested against Brightline’s 2025 results.
State and federal grantors should do the same before releasing money for the Cocoa and Stuart projects, showing in plain terms how those assets are secured.
Riders in Miami and Orlando both deserve a railroad that lasts. Taxpayers deserve to see what they would owe if it does not.
Jose E. Navarro, MBA, is a financial controller and founder of The Navarro Report, a public finance and government accountability publication. Raised in Miami and based in San Diego, he is not related to Peter Navarro.
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